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Abstract
Classification problems in security settings are usually modeled as confrontations
in which an adversary tries to fool a classifier manipulating the covariates of instances
to obtain a benefit. Most approaches to such problems have focused on game-theoretic
ideas with strong underlying common knowledge assumptions, which are not realistic
in the security realm. We provide an alternative Bayesian framework that accounts
for the lack of precise knowledge about the attacker’s behavior using adversarial risk
analysis. A key ingredient required by our framework is the ability to sample from
the distribution of originating instances given the possibly attacked observed one.
We propose a sampling procedure based on approximate Bayesian computation, in
which we simulate the attacker’s problem taking into account our uncertainty about
his elements. For large scale problems, we propose an alternative, scalable approach
that could be used when dealing with differentiable classifiers. Within it, we move
the computational load to the training phase, simulating attacks from an adversary,
adapting the framework to obtain a classifier robustified against attacks.
Keywords: Classification, Bayesian Methods, Adversarial Machine Learning, Adversarial
Risk Analysis, Deep Models.
∗Both authors contributed equally.
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1 Introduction
Over this decade, an increasing number of processes is being automated through classifi-
cation algorithms, being essential that these are robust and reliable if we are to trust key
operations based on their output. State-of-the-art classifiers perform extraordinarily well
on standard data, but they have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples, data
instances specifically targeted at fooling the algorithms (Comiter, 2019). As a fundamental
hypothesis, algorithms rely on the use of independent and identically distributed (iid) data
for both the training and test phases. However, security aspects in classification, which
form part of the field of adversarial machine learning (AML), question such hypothesis
due to the presence of adversaries ready to modify the data to obtain a benefit and, thus,
making both distributions differ.
Stemming from the pioneering work in adversarial classification (AC) in Dalvi et al.
(2004), the paradigm used to model the confrontation between adversaries and classification
systems has been game theory, see recent reviews in Biggio and Roli (2018) and Zhou et al.
(2018). As an example, the most popular attacks, including the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014b), may be viewed from a game-theoretic perspective.
Similarly, two of the most promising defence techniques, adversarial training (AT) (Madry
et al., 2018), which trains the defender model with attacked samples, and adversarial
logit pairing (ALP) (Kannan et al., 2018), which encourages the logits of the model to
be the same for both standard and adversarial inputs, may be framed in game theoretic
terms. This perspective typically entails common knowledge hypothesis (Hargreaves-Heap
and Varoufakis, 2004) which, from a fundamental point of view, are not sustainable in
settings such as security, as adversaries try to hide and conceal information. Recent work
(Naveiro et al., 2019) presented ACRA, a novel approach for AC based on Adversarial Risk
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Analysis (ARA) (Rios Insua et al., 2009). ARA makes operational the Bayesian approach
to games as in Kadane and Larkey (1982) and Raiffa (1982), facilitating robust procedures
to predict adversarial decisions. However, ACRA may be used only for generative classifiers
(Goodfellow et al., 2016), like utility sensitive Naive Bayes classifiers (Chai et al., 2004)
or deep generative classifiers based on the variational autoencoder (Kingma et al., 2014).
Moreover, only binary classification problems were supported.
We present a general framework that may be used with both discriminative and gen-
erative classifiers, deal with multiple class problems and provide efficient computational
schemes. First, a brief set up of the problem is provided. Next, we develop our general
approach and illustrate it through a malware detection problem. We then discuss computa-
tional issues and propose an efficient approach for large scale problems which we illustrate
with deep neural network classifiers in computer vision problems.
2 Basic setup
2.1 Basic notation
Consider a classifier C (she) who may receive objects belonging to k different types desig-
nated with a label yi, i = 1, ..., k. Objects have features x ∈ Rd. Uncertainty about the
objects’ types is modelled through parametric distributions p(yi|β, x), i = 1, ..., k. This dis-
tribution can come from a generative model, in which the feature distribution is explictly
modelled and the class distribution is obtained using Bayes formula, or from a discrimina-
tive model, in which the class distribution is directly modelled.
In classical approaches, data D is used to construct a maximum likelihood estimate βˆ
and p(yi|βˆ, x) is employed to classify predicting the label yi, given the estimate and the
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test instance x. C aims at maximizing expected utility (French and Rios Insua, 2000),
based on classifying x to be of type arg maxyC
∑k
i=1 uC(yC , yi)p(yi|βˆ, x), where uC(yC , yi)
is the utility that she perceives when an object with label yi is classified as of type yC .
In Bayesian approaches, a prior p(β) is used to compute the posterior p(β|D) and the
predictive distribution
p(yi|x,D) =
∫
p(yi|β, x)p(β|D)dβ, (1)
serves to classify based on maximum predictive expected utility
arg max
yC
k∑
i=1
uC(yC , yi)p(yi|x,D).
Of particular interest in our setting will be the adoption of a 0 − 1 utility function, in
which the classifier gets 1 for a correct classification, and 0 for an incorrect one. In this
case, the decision rule is arg maxyC p(yC |x,D) and we aim at maximizing the probability
of correct classification. From now on, we shall remove dependence on data D to lighten
up the notation.
Regarding the structural form of the p(yi|β, x) term, specially relevant in our devel-
opments (and in classification applications at large) are models based on a parameterized
function fβ : Rd → Rk, in which the prediction is given by
p(yi|β, x) = softmax(fβ(x))[yi], where softmax(x)[j] = expxj∑k
i=1 expxi
(2)
This formulation covers a large class of models. For example, if fβ is linear in inputs
we recover multinomial regression (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989); if we take fβ to be
a sequence of linear transformations alternating non-linear activation functions, such as
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Rectified Linear Units (ReLU), we obtain a feed-forward neural network (Goodfellow et al.,
2016).
2.2 Attacks to classifiers
Consider now another agent called adversary A (he). A applies an attack a to the features
x leading to x′ = a(x), the actual observation received by C. The attacker aims at fooling
the classifier and make her misclassify objects to attain some benefit, as it happens, e.g.,
in fraud or spam detection. We focus on exploratory attacks, defined to have influence just
over operational data, not during the training phase, and consider only integrity violations
in which the adversary just modifies bad instances. Huang et al. (2011) and Barreno et al.
(2006) provide taxonomies of attacks against classifiers.
Upon observing x′, C needs to determine the object class. An adversary unaware
classifier might be making gross mistakes as she classifies based on the received features
x′, instead of the actual ones. We provide two examples. Both adopt a 0− 1 utility. The
first one is a multiple (k = 10) class image classification problem; the second, a multiple
(k = 4) class malware detection problem.
Example 1. The best known attacks to classification algorithms modify images in a
way that alterations become imperceptible to the human eye, yet drive a model trained
on millions of images to misclassify the perturbed ones (Szegedy et al., 2014). This has
potentially relevant security consequences in e.g. managing autonomous driving systems
(Vorobeichyk and Kantarcioglu, 2019). As an example, with a relatively simple deep con-
volutional neural network (CNN) model (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) we can accurately predict
99% of the handwritten digits in the MNIST data set (LeCun et al., 1998). However, if we
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attack such set with FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014b), its accuracy gets reduced to 62%.
Figure 1 provides an example of an original image and a perturbed one. To our eyes both
images look like a 2. However, the CNN classifier identifies a 2 in the first case (Fig. 1a)
and a 7 in the perturbed one (Fig. 1b), both with high probability.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbed image
Figure 1: An original MNIST image identified as 2. A perturbed image identified as 7.
. 4
FGSM and related attacks in the literature, Vorobeichyk and Kantarcioglu (2019), assume
that the attacker has precise knowledge of the underlying model and parameters of the
involved classifier. This is debatable in most security settings.
Example 2. Consider a malware classification problem using a multinomial regression
(MR) classifier. We test robustness against attacks to MR on a dataset containing malware
and benign binaries. Malware was provided by Virus Total (Chronicle, 2018) and contains
trojans, adware and virus. Benign binaries were obtained from clean copies of the Program
Files folder of MS Windows 7 and 8. The proportion of malware binaries in the data is 50%.
Features were extracted from binaries through: the Assembly Language Source, from which
we extract registers, operation codes, API calls and keywords; and, the Portable Executable
Header, providing the symbols and imports. In total, we use 76 binary features coded with
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1 (0) indicating the presence (absence) of the corresponding characteristic. Additionally,
a label indicates whether the binary is trojan (yi = 1), adware (yi = 2), virus (yi = 3) or
benign (yi = 4). We randomly split the dataset into train and test subsets: 80%, 20%;
respectively. The test subset is attacked as in Naveiro et al. (2019) allowing the attacker to
undertake obfuscation attacks in at most 4 features. The accuracy attained with untainted
data is 69%. On the other hand, with tainted data, we only reach accuracies of 53%, 51%,
45% and 42% when, respectively, attacking 1, 2, 3 and 4 features. Note the considerable
degradation that highlights the lack of robustness to adversarial attacks of the MR model.
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3 Adversary aware classifiers
As illustrated, an adversary unaware classifier may be fooled into issuing wrong classifica-
tions potentially incurring in severe expected utility degradation. We devise strategies to
mitigate this by building models of the attacks likely to be undertaken by the adversaries.
We focus on Bayesian classification approaches but the ideas extend to classical ones.
3.1 The adversary aware classifier problem
Assume for a moment that the classifier knows the attack a that she has suffered and that
it is invertible, in the sense that we may recover the original x, designated a−1(x′) when
convenient. Then, rather than classifying based on arg maxyC
∑k
i=1 u(yC , yi)p(yi|x′), as
an adversary unaware classifier would do, she should classify based on
arg max
yC
k∑
i=1
u(yC , yi)p(yi|x = a−1(x′)).
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However, we do not know the attack a, neither, more generally, the originating x.
Suppose we model our uncertainty about the origin x of the attack through a distribu-
tion p(x|x′) with support over the set X of reasonable originating features x. Then, the
expected utility that the classifier would get for her classification decision yC would be
ψ(yC) =
∫
X
(
k∑
i=1
u(yC , yi)p(yi|x = a−1(x′)
)
p(x|x′)dx
=
k∑
i=1
u(yC , yi)
[∫
X
p(yi|x = a−1(x′))p(x|x′)dx
]
,
then having to solve
arg max
yC
ψ(yC). (3)
Typically, we approximate the expected utilities by Monte Carlo (MC) using a sample
{xn}Nn=1 from p(x|x′) so that ψ̂(yC) = 1N
∑k
i=1 u(yC , yi)
[∑N
n=1 p(yi|xn)
]
. Algorithm 1 sum-
marises the general procedure that we later specify.
For this approach to be operational, we need to be able to estimate X and p(x|x′)
or, at least, sample from this distribution. Assuming that we can define a metric λ in
the feature space, a first heuristic would be to define the set X of reasonable originating
features as those x such that λ(x, x′) < ρ for a certain threshold ρ. We could then take
p(x|x′) as a uniform distribution over X . Alternatively, we could make p(x|x′) = h
λ(x,x′) ,
where 1
h
=
∑
x∈X
1
λ(x,x′) , ignoring x
′ as possible origin. These heuristics formalize the fact
that changing instances entails some cost for the adversary that probably increases with
the number of features changed.
However, as shown in R´ıos Insua et al. (2020), better forecasts are typically attained if
we explicitly model the attacker’s behaviour using the information available about him, as
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Algorithm 1 General ARA procedure for Adversarial Classification
Input: N , training data D, prior p(β).
Output: A classification decision y∗C(x
′).
Training
Based on D and p(β), compute p(β|D) and p(yi|x) for all i.
End Training
Operation
Read instance x′
Estimate X and p(x|x′), x ∈ X
Draw sample {xn}Nn=1 from p(x|x′).
Find y∗C(x
′) = arg maxyC
1
N
∑k
i=1
(
u(yC , yi)
[∑N
n=1 p(yi|xn)
])
End Operation
Return y∗C(x
′)
we do next.
3.2 An Approximate Bayesian Computation sampling approach
An approach to sample from p(x|x′) that leverages information available about the attacker
is now discussed. We call it AB-ACRA, being based on approximate Bayesian computation
(ABC), Csille´ry et al. (2010). As basic ingredients, it requires us to be able to generate
samples from x ∼ p(x) and x′ ∼ p(x′|x).
3.2.1 Basic ingredients
Estimating p(x) is possible using training data, which is untainted by assumption. For
this, we can use an implicit generative model, such as a generative adversarial network
(Goodfellow et al., 2014a) or an energy-based model (Grathwohl et al., 2019).
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On the other hand, sampling from p(x′|x) entails strategic thinking, which we shall treat
with the ARA methodology. Without loss of generality, assume that the attacker considers
interesting for him the first l classes (call them bad), the other ones being irrelevant for
him (good): he is interested in modifying data associated with instances belonging to the
first l classes to make C believe that they belong to the remaining ones. As an example,
consider a fraudster who may commit l types of fraud; he crafts the corresponding x to
make C think that she has received a legitimate object of class i, with i > l. As we only
consider integrity violations, we base our analysis on the decomposition
p(x′|x) =
k∑
i=1
p(x′|x, yi)p(yi|x) =
l∑
i=1
p(x′|x, yi)p(yi|x) +
k∑
i=l+1
I(x′ = x)p(yi|x),
where I is the indicator function. We can easily generate samples from p(yi|x), as we
can estimate those probabilities based on training data as in (1). Then, we can obtain
samples from p(x′|x) by sampling yi ∼ p(yi|x) first and, then, if i > l return x or sample
x′ ∼ p(x′|x, yi) otherwise.
To sample from p(x′|x, yi), the ARA methodology helps us to model the Attacker de-
cision problem when he has available an instance x with label yi. As we are not assuming
common knowledge, we need to model our uncertainty about the Attacker elements. As-
sume that agent A also aims at maximizing his expected utility when trying to confuse
C. His utility function has the form uA(yC , yi), when C says yC and the actual label is yi.
He would choose the attack (feature modification) that maximizes his expected utility by
making C classify instances as most beneficial as possible to him. For this, assume that
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the utility that A derives from C’s decision has the following structure:
ujiA := uA(yC = yj, yi) =

0, if i ≤ l and j ≤ l
ujiA 6= 0, if i ≤ l and j > l
0, if i > l
This reflects that the Attacker just obtains benefit when he makes the defender classify a
bad instance as if it was a good one.
By transforming instance x with label yi for i = 1, . . . , l into instance x
′, the attacker
would get an expected utility
k∑
c=1
uA(yC = yc, yi)pA(yC = c|x′) =
k∑
c=l+1
uciA pA(yC = c|x′), (4)
where pA(yC |x′) describes the probability that C says type yC if she observes x′, from A’s
perspective. The Attacker will typically be uncertain about such probability. Suppose
we model it with a density fA(pA(yC |x′)), with mean pcA(x′). Taking expectations in (4),
the expected utility he would get is
∑k
c=l+1 u
ci
A p
c
A(x
′). Thus, the attacker would choose his
action through
x′(x, yi) = arg max
z∈X
k∑
c=l+1
uciA p
c
A(z), (5)
and craft object (x, yi) into (x
′(x, yi), yi).
However, we do not know uA neither p
c
A with certitude. Suppose we model our uncer-
tainty about these elements with, respectively, random utilities UA and random expected
probabilities P cA, defined over an appropriate probability space. We would look for the
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random optimal transformation defined by
X
′
(x, yi) = arg max
z∈X
k∑
c=l+1
U ciAP
c
A(z), (6)
and make p(x|x′, yi) = Pr(X ′(x, yi) = x′). Then, by construction, if we sample uA ∼ UA
and pcA ∼ P cA and solve
x′ = arg max
z∈X
k∑
c=l+1
uciAp
c
A(z),
x′ would be distributed according to p(x′|x, yi).
Of the required elements, it is relatively easy to model the random utilities UA. We
may scale these utilities between 0 and 1 (French and Rios Insua, 2000) and use Uci ∼
Beta(αci, βci). If information about the likely values of the utilities is available, we may
assess them through appropriate α and β values; if information about possible perceived
rankings of the utilities is available, we may introduce them as constraints and sample by
rejection.
Modeling P cA(x
′) is more delicate. It entails strategic thinking as C needs to model her
opponent’s beliefs about what classification she will adopt upon observing x′. This could
be the beginning of a hierarchy of decision making problems, as described in Rios and
Rios Insua (2012) in a much simpler context. A relevant heuristic consists of modelling
P cA(x
′) using a distribution based on p(yC |x′) with some uncertainty around it. For this,
given x′, consider the set X of reasonable origins from Section 3.1. Imagine we assess a
distribution p∗(x|x′) over it, for example using the metric based approach as there defined.
Let meanc =
∑
x p(yC |x)p∗(x|x′) and, for a given variance varc, choose P cA(x′) ∼ Beta(α, β)
having the above meanc and varc, for which we just make α
c =
(
1−meanc
varc
− 1
meanc
)
mean2c
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and βc = αc
(
1
meanc
− 1
)
. In the above expression for meanc, p(yC |x) would come from
the estimates based on untainted data in (1); to reduce the computational cost, we could
approximate meanc through
1
M
∑M
n=1 p(yC |xn), for a sample {xn}Mn=1 from p∗(x|x′).
3.2.2 AB-ACRA
Once we are able to sample from p(x) and p(x′|x), we need a procedure to sample from
p(x|x′). In the discrete case1, we can use rejection sampling (Casella et al. (2004)). This
entails generating x ∼ p(X), x˜′ ∼ p(X ′|X = x), and accepting x only if x˜′ coincides with
the actually observed instance x′. It is straightforward to prove that x ∼ p(X|X ′ = x′). We
can think of this procedure as generating instances x and indicators I, where I = 0(= 1) if
we reject (accept) the sample. Accepted instances are distributed according to
p(X = x|I = 1) ∝ p(I = 1|X = x)p(X = x) ∝ p(X ′ = x′|X = x)p(X = x)
which, using Bayes rule, coincides with the desired distribution.
When x′ is continuous and/or high dimensional, the acceptance rate would typically
be very low, making the above approach inefficient. In such cases, we can leverage ABC
techniques. This entails accepting the sample x if φ(x˜′, x′) < TOL, for a given distance φ
and tolerance TOL. The x generated in this manner is distributed approximately according
to p(x|x′). However, the probability of generating samples for which φ(x˜′, x′) < TOL
decreases as the dimensionality of x′ increases. A common solution replaces the acceptance
criterion by φ(s(x˜′), s(x′)) < TOL, where s(x) is a set of summary statistics that capture
the relevant information in x. The particular choice of summary statistics is problem
1Here, for convenience, we distinguish between random variables and realizations using upper and lower
cases, respectively. Thus, X ′ refers to the actually observed instance and X to the originating one.
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specific. We summarise the whole procedure in Algorithm 2, which would be integrated
within Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 ABC scheme to sample from p(x|x′)
Input: Observed instance x′, data model p(x), UA, P cA, family of statistics s, TOL.
Output: A sample approximately distributed according to p(x|x′).
while φ(s(x′), s(x˜′)) > TOL do
Sample x ∼ p(x)
Sample yi ∼ p(yi|x)
if i > l then
x˜′ = x
else
Sample uA ∼ UA and pcA ∼ P cA
Compute x˜′ = arg maxz∈X
∑k
c=l+1 u
ci
Ap
c
A(z)
end if
Compute φ(s(x′), s(x˜′))
end while
return x
4 An example in multiclass malware detection
We illustrate the proposed approach with a malware detection problem2. Malware of dif-
ferent types is increasingly being delivered by attackers to obtain a benefit, being a current
major global cyber threat (ENISA, 2019). Malware types include, among others: trojans,
aimed at misleading the victim of its real intention of accessing personal information such
as passwords; adware, which releases advertisements through the victim interface; or virus,
that can replicate itself modifying other programs causing system failures, wasting host re-
sources or corrupting data. It is crucial to detect the appropriate type of malware to decide
2All code to reproduce these experiments is available at https://github.com/roinaveiro/ACRA_2.
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the relevant countermeasures and mitigate its consequences. Recently, obfuscation attacks
on malware binaries (You and Yim, 2010) have gained relevance as they affect critically
the performance of detection algorithms as shown in Example 2. We test the performance
of AB-ACRA as a defence mechanism against obfuscation attacks, based on a 0-1 utility
for the Defender.
For these experiments, we use the same dataset as in Example 2. As underlying classi-
fication algorithm we deploy MR with L1 regularization. This is equivalent to performing
maximum a posteriori estimation in an MR model with a Laplace prior, Park and Casella
(2008). The regularization parameter was chosen using cross validation. Mean and stan-
dard deviations of accuracies in all experiments are estimated via repeated hold-out vali-
dation over ten repetitions (Kim, 2009). The accuracy of this approach on clean test data
is 0.68± 0.01.
To compare AB-ACRA with raw MR on tampered data, we simulate attacks over the
instances in the test set. For this purpose, we solved problem (6) for each test malware
binary, removing the uncertainty that is not present from the adversary’s point of view.
We restrict to attacks that involve changing at most the value of one of the features.
The utility that the attacker perceives when he makes the defender misclassify a malware
binary is 0.7 for all malware types. Finally, the adversary would have uncertainty about
pcA(x
′), as this quantity depends on the defender’s decision. We test AB-ACRA against a
worst case adversary who knows the true value of p(yC |xn) and estimates pcA(x′) through
1
M
∑M
n=1 p(yC |xn) for a sample {xn}Mn=1 from p∗(x|x′). We set M = 40. For p∗(x|x′) we use
a uniform distribution on the set of all instances at distance 1 from the observed x′, using
as distance λ(x, x′) =
∑76
i=1 |xi − x′i|.
To model the uncertainty about pcA(x
′) and the attacker’s utility function from the
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defender’s perspective, we use beta distributions centered at the attacker’s values of prob-
abilities and utilities, respectively, with variances chosen to guarantee that the distribution
is concave in its support: they must be bounded from above by min
{
[µ2(1 − µ)]/(1 +
µ), [µ(1− µ)2]/(2− µ)}, were µ is the corresponding mean. We set the variance to be 10%
of this upper bound.
For the AB-ACRA algorithm, we used the 12 most relevant features (in terms of their
coefficients having the highest posterior mode in absolute value) as summary statistics
s. Figure 2a compares the accuracy of ACRA and MR for different sample sizes N in
Algorithm 1, and tolerance TOL = 2. As we can see, ACRA beats MR in tainted data
with just 5 samples. The accuracy saturates quickly as we increase the number of samples.
Thus, we get good performance with a relatively small sample size. Figure 2b plots the
accuracy of ACRA against MR for different values of TOL. As expected, as this parameter
decreases, accuracy increases, albeit at a higher computational cost.
(a) Experiment for different number of samples. (b) Experiment for different values of tolerance.
Figure 2: Accuracy comparison LR vs AB-ACRA.
Finally, we compare AB-ACRA with tolerance 1 (this value was found to give reason-
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able results for a moderate computational time), with MR and a heuristic approach that
assumes that p(x|x′) is a uniform distribution over all possible instances at distance one
from the observed x′. MR and the heuristic approach both obtained accuracy 0.52± 0.01,
while AB-ACRA obtained 0.66 ± 0.01. As anticipated in Section 3.1, defences that do
not model explicitly the attacker’s behavior have worse performance. However, AB-ACRA
outperforms the heuristic approach and the raw MR as it explicitly models the attacker’s
behaviour.
5 Large scale differentiable models
5.1 Introduction
The previous example allowed us to illustrate the general framework in a relatively simple
setting with a moderate (76) number of binary features and constraints on the allowed
number of changes. The scheme proposed may entail very heavy computational costs in
high-dimensional settings, as sampling from p(x|x′) may be very costly. This approach is
clearly not feasible computationally in high-dimensional domains, such as with image data.
To overcome the computational bottleneck, we shall bypass some steps from the ap-
proach in Section 3, when considering classifiers which are differentiable with respect to
their parameters. These models have the benefit of being amenable to training using
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) (Bottou, 2010).The use of scalable optimization meth-
ods facilitates training deep neural networks with large amounts of high-dimensional data
as with text data or images, since these methods enable iterative optimization using only
a mini-batch of examples at each iteration, alleviating the computational burden. In par-
ticular, our driving case will use deep neural networks with images, although the ideas
17
extend to differentiable models at large. Finally, instead of dealing with the attacker in the
operation phase, as done in the previous sections, we shift to modify the training phase to
account for future adversarial perturbations.
Essentially, with this paradigm shift, we shall be able to avoid the expensive sampling
from p(x|x′) only requiring doing it from p(x′|x) using gradient information from the de-
fender model. The crucial point is that it is easier to estimate p(x′|x) from an adversary,
just requiring an opponent model, than to estimate p(x|x′), which requires inverting the
opponent model. Obviously, there does not exist a notion of gradient in every model and
we would need to resort to the previous approach in those cases.
5.2 Concept
For clarity, we use 0 − 1 utilities, but extensions to more general utilities follow a similar
path. We thus focus on implementing the decision rule
arg max
yC
∫∫
p(yC |x, β)p(x|x′)p(β|D)dx dβ (7)
in a general scalable and robust manner.
The usual adversarial robustness definition (Katz et al., 2017) requires that arg maxy p(y|x, β) ≈
arg maxy p(y|x′, β), that is, for any input x and adversarial perturbation x′ ∼ p(·|x, y) the
predicted class should not change under an adversarial attack. On the other hand, ALP
(Kannan et al., 2018) defences try to impose the stronger condition, p(y|x, β) ≈ p(y|x′, β),
with improved robustness. In our proposal, we require the slightly stronger condition
p(y, x|β) ≈ p(y, x′|β). (8)
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Though condition (8) may impose an extra computational burden, we provide a way to
train the defender model to achieve such condition, improving robustness compared to
baselines. First, to compute p(x, y|β), as in energy-based models (Grathwohl et al., 2019)
we reinterpret the logits of model (2) as in , leading to an expression for the joint probability
p(x, y|β) = exp{fβ(x)[y]}
Z(β)
, where Z(β) is the usually intractable normalizing constant. We
factor the joint distribution p(y, x|β) = p(y|x, β)p(x|β). Then, for a sample x ∼ D and the
corresponding adversarial perturbation x′ ∼ p(x′|x), we optimize
max
β
L(β, x, y) = {log p(y|x, β) + log p(y|x′, β)− |fβ(x)− fβ(x′)| − | log p(x|β)− log p(x′|β)|} .
(9)
A few comments are in order. The first two terms promote high predictive power for both
p(y|x, β) and p(y|x′, β). The third term encourages the logits of x and x′ to be similar,
leading to p(y|x, β) ≈ p(y|x′, β). Finally, the last term acts as a regularizer, encouraging
p(x|β) ≈ p(x′|β) and, with the previous term, leading to condition (8). Note that since we
have a difference of the originally intractable terms, log p(x|β)−log p(x′|β), the normalizing
constant Z(β) cancels out rendering tractable the analysis.
At the end of training, we would have p(x|β) ≈ p(x′|β). This implies that p(x|x′) ≈
p(x′|x) using Bayes formula. Then, incorporating p(y|x, β) ≈ p(y|x′, β), we can swap the
original decision rule (7) by arg maxyC
∫
p(yC |x′, β)p(x′|x)p(β|D)dx′dβ. However, since the
observed input x′ might be tainted, it is not necessary to attack it via p(x′|x) anymore
and just suffices to use the test time decision rule, arg maxyC p(yC |x′, β). To sum up, by
imposing p(x|β) ≈ p(x′|β) during training, we obtain a robust model which has learned
that starting in either x or x′, it does not matter whether we use p(x′|x) or p(x|x′) as we
arrive at the same distribution, being simpler to sample from p(x′|x). We explain how to
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sample from this distribution in Section 5.3.
Note that the proposed framework is not just a mere mash-up of AT, ALP and our new
regularizer, with its own computational benefits. In the next paragraphs, we use the ARA
methodology to add a layer of uncertainty over the previous terms with two objectives: i)
depart from standard common knowledge assumptions in adversarial classification; and ii)
enhance robustness and prevent from overfitting.
5.3 Simulating attacks with ARA
With continuous data, adversarial perturbations x′ are typically computed solving the
constrained optimization problem x′ = arg minx′∈B(x) log p(y|x′, β), where B(x) is some
neighborhood of the x in which the attacker has influence on. Solving the previous problem
exactly is intractable in high-dimensional data. Thus, attacks in the literature resort to
approximations using gradient information. One of the most popular ones is FGSM, used
in Example 1 and given by x′ = x− sign∇x log p(y|x, β), where  is a step size that assesses
attack intensity. However, there are other examples such as the Projected Gradient Descent
(Madry et al. (2018)) or the Carlini and Wagner (2017) attack. These assume that the
attacker has full knowledge of the target model, which is unrealistic in security settings.
Adversarial training using FGSM would correspond to sampling from a Dirac delta dis-
tribution centered at the FGSM update, that is, p(x′|x) = δ(x′−(x− sign∇x log p(y|x, β))).
More realistically, based on the ARA approach we introduce two sources of uncertainty.
Defender uncertainty over attacker model p(x′|x). Instead of performing an opti-
mization to arrive at a single point, we replace SGD with an SG-MCMC sampler such as
SGLD (Welling and Teh, 2011) to sample from regions with high adversarial loss, propor-
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tional to exp{− log p(y|x, β)}. This leads to iterates xt+1 = xt− t sign∇x log p(y|xt, β) + ξt
for ξt ∼ N (0, 2t) and t = 1, . . . , T , where t are step sizes that decay to zero following
the Robbins and Monro (1951) conditions. We also consider uncertainty over the hyperpa-
rameters  (from a Gamma distribution, or better a re-scaled Beta, since too high or too
low learning rates are futile) and the number of iterations T (from a Poisson). In addition,
we can consider mixtures of different attacks, for instance by sampling a Bernoulli random
variable and then choosing the gradient corresponding to either FGSM or another attack
as in Carlini and Wagner’s. Algorithm 3 generates adversarial perturbations that take into
account the uncertainty we have over the attacker’s model.
Algorithm 3 Large scale attack simulation
Input: Defender model p(y|x, β), a set of particles {βi}Ki=1 and attacker model p(x′|x).
Output: A set of adversarial examples {xi}Ki=1 from attacker model.
Sample T ∼ p(T )
Sample  ∼ p()
for each attack iteration t from 1 to T do
xi,t+1 = xi,t + ∇L(xi,t, y, βi) +N (0, 2I)
end for
Return xi = xi,T
Attacker uncertainty over the defender model p(y|x, β). Since the attacker may
not know the actual p(y|x, β), our model for his behaviour will take into account our
uncertainty over β.
A first possibility is to consider an augmented model p(y|x, β, γ) with γ ∼ Bernoulli(p);
then, if γ = 0, p(y|x, β, 0) may be given by a logistic regression, whereas if γ = 1, p(y|x, β, 1)
is a neural network, for example. This would reflect the lack of information that the
attacker has over the current architecture he is targeting. The case can be straightforwardly
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implemented using an ensemble model Hastie et al. (2009), performing simulated attacks
over it.
Alternatively, β may have continuous support. In the case of a NN, this would reflect
the fact that the attacker has uncertainty over the value of the parameters. This can
be implemented using scalable Bayesian approaches in deep models, such as SG-MCMC
schemes (Ma et al., 2015). To this end, we propose that the defended model is trained using
SGLD, obtaining posterior samples via the iteration βt+1 = βt−η∇βL(βt, x, y)+N (0, 2ηI),
with loss L(β, x, y) as in (9) and sampling x′ using p(x′|x) as in the previous paragraph.
Algorithm 4 uses the previous perturbations to robustly train the defender model.
Algorithm 4 Large scale ARA training
Input: Defender model p(y|x, β) and attacker model p(x′|x).
Output: A set of particles {βi}Ki=1 that approximates the posterior distribution of the
defender model learned using ARA training.
for each training iteration t do
sample x1, . . . , xK ∼ p(x′|x) using Alg. 3
βi,t+1 = βi,t − ∇L(xi, y, βi,t) +N (0, 2I) for each i (SGLD)
end for
return βi = βi,T
Finally, Algorithm 5 integrates and summarises the general procedure
5.4 Experiments
We apply now the proposed approach to a mainstream dataset in computer vision, MNIST
(LeCun et al., 1998), showcasing the benefits via experiments3. The objective of the de-
fender is to correctly classify the digits (from 0 to 9) even in presence of the previous
adversarial attacks, in a similar spirit to that of Example 1.
3All code to reproduce these experiments is available at https://github.com/vicgalle/ARA-for-AT.
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Algorithm 5 General ARA procedure for Robust Training of Differentiable Models
Input: training data D, prior p(β).
Output: A classification decision y∗C(x
′).
Training
Use Algorithm 4 to obtain an approximation of p(β|D) (robustified posterior).
End Training
Operation
Read instance x′
Find y∗C(x
′) = arg maxyC
∑k
i=1 u(yC , yi)
∫
p(yi|x′, β)p(β|D)dβ
End Operation
return y∗C(x
′)
Figure 4 plots the security evaluation curves (Biggio and Roli, 2018) for three different
defences under the MNIST dataset, using two attacks at test time: FGSM and Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD). Such curves depict the accuracy of the defender model at this
task (y-axis), under different attack intensities  (x-axis).
The defender model is a 2 layer feed-forward neural network with ReLU activations
and a final softmax layer to get the predictions over the 10 classes. Pytorch code for the
network is shown in Figure 3.
The net is trained using SGD with momentum (0.5) for 5 epochs, using a learning rate
of 0.01 and a batch size of 32. The training set corresponds to 50000 digit images, and
we report results over a 10000 digits test set. As for uncertainties from Section 5.3, we
use both kinds of them, except we do not adopt mixtures of different attacks or different
models, since we preferred to focus the scope of this paper in the single-attacker setting.
Note in Figure 4 how the uncertainties provided by the ARA training method substantially
improve the robustness of the neural network under two different attacks.
We also compute the energy gap ∆E := Ex∼D [− log p(x)] − Ex′∼D′ [− log p(x′)] for a
given test set D and its attacked counterpart D′ under the PGD attack. This serves as
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Figure 3: Model architecture for the feed-forward network.
(a) FGSM attack. (b) PGD attack under `1 norm.
Figure 4: Robustness of a deep network for MNIST under three different defence mecha-
nisms and two attacks.
a proxy to measure the degree of fulfilment of our enabling assumption p(x) ≈ p(x′). We
obtain that ∆ENone = 2.204,∆EAT = 1.763, and ∆EARA = 0.070. Note that the ARA
version improves the gap with respect to their counterparts, thus getting closer to the
desired adversarial assumption that a robust model should fulfill p(x) ≈ p(x′), having a
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positive regularization effect as well.
6 Conclusions
Adversarial classification is an increasingly important field in adversarial machine learning
with many security applications. The pioneering work of Dalvi et al. (2004) has framed
most approaches within the standard game-theoretic context, in spite of the unrealistic
common knowledge assumptions required, even questioned by the authors. On the other
hand, there has been several attempts in the Bayesian community to develop more robust
models, such as Miller and Dunson (2019). However, none of these approaches model ex-
plicitly the presence of adversaries and consequently do not perform properly in adversarial
environments.
In this paper, we have proposed a general, Bayesian probabilistic framework for ad-
versarial classification that models explicitly the presence of an adversary. It is general in
the sense that application-specific assumptions are kept to a minimum. A key ingredient
required by our framework is the ability to sample from p(x|x′), that is, the distribution
of originating instances given the (possibly attacked) observed one. Different sampling
approaches could be used depending on the specific application and the available infor-
mation about the attacker. Introducing explicit attacking models is crucial to get good
performance. Thus, we introduced AB-ACRA, a sampling scheme that leverages ARA to
explicitly model the adversary’s knowledge and interests, adding the uncertainty we have
about them, mitigating strong common knowledge assumptions prevalent in the literature.
For large scale problems, AB-ACRA could be computationally expensive. Thus, we propose
an alternative approach for differentiable models. In it, we instead move the computational
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load to the training phase, simulating attacks from an adversary using the ARA approach,
and then adapting the training framework to obtain a classifier robustified against these
attacks.
Several lines for further research are worth pursuing. We highlight three of them. First,
we have just considered integrity violation attacks, that aim at getting malicious instances
misclassified as legitimate. Extensions to availability violation attacks, those whose goal
is to increase the wrong classification rate of legitimate instances would be important.
Also, we have restricted to the case in which the attacker performs intentional attacks.
In some contexts, there could be, in addition, random attacks. The proposed framework
could be extended to take those into account as well as to the case in which there are
several attackers. Second, the AB-ACRA scheme presented is based on a vanilla version of
ABC. An interesting line of future research is the adaptation of more sophisticated versions.
Finally, the approach for differentiable models could be improved as well. Since it requires
an SG-MCMC method to simulate attacks, instead of the vanilla SGLD sampler, we could
use more efficient samplers, such as the ones introduced in Gallego and Insua (2018).
Also we have emphasised differentiable models, but there might be the possibility of using
subdifferentials in more general settings.
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